If a person makes a truthful statement with the intention of deceiving another person, then he is not lying, according to the condition of lying. For example, when John and Mary are together and Valentino is Mary`s ex-boyfriend, and one night « John asks Mary, `Have you seen Valentino this week?` and « Mary replies, `Valentino has been suffering from mononucleosis for two weeks` and `Valentino has actually had mononucleosis for two weeks, but it is also true that Mary had a date with Valentino the night before` (Coleman and Kany 1981, 31), so Mary does not lie to John, even if she tries to deceive John. This is called a butterfly (see Schauer and Zeckhauser 2009; they illegitimately add that a butterfly must succeed in deception), or false implication (Adler 1997) or attempt to mislead (Saul 2012b; Webber, 2013). Fried`s definition of lying can be worded as follows (modified to include cases where speakers only intend to mislead their beliefs): According to Chisholm and Feehan, any lie is a violation of a listener`s right because « It is assumed that if person x claims a statement p to another person y, then Y has the right to expect, which X himself believes P. And it is assumed that x knows, or at least should know, that if he claims p to y, while he himself believes that p is not true, then he violates this right of y » (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 153, [variables have been modified for consistency]). Nevertheless, this is not part of their definition of lying that lying implies the violation of another person`s right. According to most philosophers, the claim that lying is morally reprehensible (defensible or indefensible) is « a synthetic judgment, not analytical » (Kemp and Sullivan 1993, 153). However, « lying » is considered by some philosophers to be a thick ethical term that both describes a type of action and evaluates that type of action morally negatively (Williams 1985, 140). For some philosophers, « the illegitimacy of lying.
integrated into the definition of the term » (Kemp and Sullivan, 1993, 153). For these philosophers, the claim that lying (defensible or indefensible) is morally false is a tautology (Margolis 1962). Since it is possible to lie without having the primary intention to deceive, Simpson`s definition must be modified accordingly: in the case of a lie, the speaker tries to deceive the listener into believing a falsehood. Note, however, that this lie is (usually) not what the speaker says. On the contrary, the lie that the speaker is trying to make the listener believe is that the speaker believes that the statement is true. It is the intention to deceive by lying (although strictly speaking the deception is intentional and unintentional (« Essentially, according to this definition, you only lie if you expect to succeed in deceiving someone about what you believe » (Fallis 2009, 45)). For German speakers, the term « song » has a long history, ranging from troubadour songs (Minnesang) of the twelfth century to folk songs and church songs to workers` songs or protest songs (cabaret songs, protest songs). [ref. needed] Typically, songs are arranged for a single singer and piano, songs with orchestral accompaniment are a later development. Some of the best-known examples of songs are Schubert`s Erlkönig, Der Tod und das Mädchen, Gretchen am Spinnrade and Schubert`s Der Doppelgänger. Sometimes songs are composed in a song cycle (Deutscher Liederzyklus or Liederkreis), a series of songs (usually three or more) connected by a single narrative or theme, such as Schubert`s Die schöne Müllerin and Winterreise or Robert Schumann`s Frauen-Liebe und Leben und Dichterliebe. Schubert and Schumann are most closely associated with this genre, which developed especially in the Romantic era.
  Another objection to D1 (and D2 and D3) is that it is not enough to deceive one person to intentionally deceive another person into falsely believing that he or she really believes or knows to be false; it must also be caused by evidence and the evidence must be provided by the person to make the other person believe (Linsky, 1970, p. 163; Fuller, 1976, p. 23; Schmitt, 1988, p. 185; Barnes, 1997, p. 14; Mahon, 2007). If Andrew deliberately tricks Ben into believing (wrongly) that there are vampires in England, for example by operating on Ben`s brain, electroshocking Ben or drugging Ben, Andrew does not fool Ben into believing that there are vampires in England. Even though Andrew makes Ben believe that vampires exist in England by reading a book that is supposed to show that vampires exist in England, Andrew Ben does not fool him into believing that there are vampires in England. However, if Andrew writes a book claiming to show that there are vampires in England, and Ben reads the book, and Ben therefore believes that there are vampires in England, then Andrew is deceiving Ben that there are vampires in England (Fuller 1976). A modified definition of interpersonal deception that includes this objection is as follows: Don Fallis also believes that it is possible to lie without trying to deceive.
He also defended the condition of claiming to lie: « You lie when you claim something you believe to be false » (Fallis 2009, 33). He found that when you make a statement, you make a statement and believe you`re in a situation where Grice`s conversational standard, « Don`t say what you think is wrong, » is in effect. His definition of lying was as follows: if x makes a false statement to y, without the intention that y believes that this false statement is true, but with the intention that y will believe something other than x believes to be true, then x does not lie to y, according to L1. Examples of such false and non-misleading statements are polite lies (Kant 1997, 27; Mahon, 2003, p. 109). For example, when the servant Igor makes the false statement to the unwanted visitor Damian: « Madame is not at home », without the intention that Damian believes that it is true, that she is not at home (it would be on Igor`s side), but with the intention that Damian believes that it is true, that it is embarrassing for Madame, To see Damian now, something Igor believes to be true, so Igor does not lie to Damian, according to L1 (Isenberg 1973, 256). However, for Igor to intend for Damian to believe this, it must be the case for Igor to believe that Damian understands this: « Madame is not home. » Polite lies can be called examples of « falsifications but not lies » because the person « says exactly what the label requires » (Shiffrin 2014, 19). As has been said about false statements, situations « where politeness requires some sort of remark » and the other person « knows full well that the statement is false, » such statements are « not really lies » (Coleman & Kay, 1981, p.
29). They are best thought of as code conversation cases. Another example of a non-misleading false statement is a so-called « altruistic lie » (Fallis 2009, 50; cf. Augustine 1952, 57), for example when a speaker makes a false statement to a listener whom he believes to be suspicious so that the listener believes to be something that the speaker believes to be true.